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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IDA M. JOHNSON, Administra-
trix of the estate of C. Tennyson 
Johnson, Deceased. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba 
HARDMAN AUTO SALES, 
NATHAN CHILD and 
BARRUS MOTOR COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8647 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
ARTHUR HARDMAN 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On December 20, 1955, Nathan Child was driv-
ing a 1951 International Pickup Truck east on 
Highway 40, approximately 10 miles west of Salt 
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Lake City when the vehicle suddenly veered from 
the south center of the highway to the north side, 
where it collided with an automobile driven by one 
George Williams, in which C. Tennyson Johnson 
was riding, resulting in fatal injuries to him. The 
plaintiff as the administratrix of his estate brought 
an action to recover damages against Nathan Child, 
Arthur Hardman, dba Hardman Auto Sales and 
Barrus Motor Company. The suit was brought 
against Hardman as a defendant on the theory that 
Child was his servant or agent and against Barrus 
Motor Company on the theory that the steering ap-
paratus and the wheels of the vehicle were in a 
defective condition, which the Barrus Motor Com-
pany knew or should have known. 
The allegations of negligence were denied by 
all three defendants. Hardman also denied that 
Child was his agent or servant. 
At the close of the evidence the court, upon mo-
tion, dismissed the Barrus Motor Company from 
the action. The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendants Hard-
man and Child in the sum of $43,628.23. 
This appeal is taken by the defendant Hard-
man upon the grounds that there was no evidence 
to submit to the jury on the issue of whether Child 
was his servant or agent and that his motion for 
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a directed verdict of no cause of action should have 
been granted. He also contends that the court er-
roneously gave certain instructions and refused to 
give others. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Hardman is a resident of Sun-
set, Utah, where he operated a garage and a used 
car lot ( R. 35). The defendant Child had known 
Hardman for some time before December 20, 1955 
(the date of the accident). They were friends and 
Child had purchased cars from him in the past. 
Sometime before the date of the accident Child told 
Hardman that he was interested in buying a used 
pickup truck. ( R. 26). Sometime after, Hardman 
informed Child that he thought he had located a 
pickup in Tooele, Utah, which might interest him 
and arrangements were made for Child to accom-
pany Hardman on the trip to Tooele in order that 
he could see the vehicle ( R. 26). They drove from 
Sunset to Tooele in Hardman's wrecker truck (R. 
21). Hardman did not pay Child to make the trip, 
nor did Child pay any of the trip expense (R. 26). 
The pickup truck was an International '51. 
It looked "pretty good" to Child. They took the 
truck on a test run, observed that there were some 
defects, consisting of broken glass and the oil pump 
and speedometer were not functioning properly 
(R. 27). Child told Hardman if these defects were 
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repaired, he would buy the truck ( R. 28) . The re-
pairs were made to Child's satisfaction and he told 
Hardman he would accept it (R. 28 and 40). The 
Agreed purchase price before they left Tooele was 
$650.00 (R. 30, 40), of which Child intended 
to pay Hardman $500.00 when he returned to Sun-
set, plus the trade-in value of a 1941 Ford, that 
Hardman would give Child credit for the $150.00 
balance which he would pay in about ninety days 
( R. 30). In the course of this conversation Hardman 
told Child that he would not pay Barrus Motor 
Company for the car unless he (Child) would take 
it as he didn't want it in his stock (R. 27, 31, 40). 
Hardman paid Barrus Motor Company $600.00 for 
the pickup, received the Certificate of Title from 
them but not the registration certificate (R. 36, 
41-42). In addition, there may have been a Bill of 
Sale or other papers. Hardman delivered none of 
these documents to Child. It was Hardman's under-
standing that the transaction was completed verb-
ally except the paper work, which would be done 
when they returned to Sunset (R. 31, 41). Hard-
man placed his dealer's license plates on the truck. 
On cross-examination by counsel, Hardman 
testified that he did not intend to transfer the title to 
Child until they got home (R. 37). However, his sub-
sequent testimony clearly establishes that by "title" 
he meant a document or piece of paper as distin-
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guished from the property interest in the truck 
(R. 38, 46, 48). 
Hardman intended to take Child's note for the 
$150.00 balance due on the purchase price (R. 44-
47). 
Child drove the truck on the return trip from 
Tooele. Hardman suggested they pass each other 
occasionally (R. 32), which was the extent of the 
conversation between Hardman and Child concern-
ing the latter's operation of the truck (R. 32). 
Shortly after leaving Tooele Hardman stopped his 
vehicle. Child pulled up behind him and also stopped 
( R. 34) . No signals or directions ·were given by 
liardman to Child either before or after making 
this stop (R. 34). After resu1ning the trip the col-
lision occurred approximately one and one-half 
n1iles ·west of the lVIorton Salt Plant on U.S. High-
vvay 40. 
STA.TEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD 
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SER-
VANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON 
THE LAvV AND BY FAILING TO SUBl\HT TO THE 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD 
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SER-
VANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN. 
'This case arose out of the same accident as 
that of Walter Anderson vs. Arthur Hardman, dba 
Hardman Auto Sales, Nathan Child and Barrus 
Motor Company, No. 8580, now pending on appeal 
in this Court. The evidence in each case on the ques-
tion of agency or the right of Hardman to control 
Child in the operation of the pickup differed only 
in that in this case there was more detailed testi-
mony from Hardman as to his intentions with res-
pect to taking Child's note for the balance of the 
purchase price (R. 44-49), which supports the ap-
pellant's contention that the ownership of the pick-
up had passed from Hardman to Child before they 
left Tooele on the return trip to Sunset. 
Section 41-1-72, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
provides that title to an automobile shall be deemed 
not to have passed until the title is transferred in 
accordance with the requirements of the Motor Ve-
hicle Law. However, the decision of Jackson vs. 
James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235, held that as be-
tween the parties themselves compliance with the 
statute was unnecessary to transfer ownership. This 
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decision was reaffirmed in Heaston v. Martinez, 3 
Utah 2d 259, 282 P. 2d 833, where this Court again 
recognized that delivery of the Certificate of Title 
properly endorsed was not essential to a valid sale 
of an automobile. 
As stated in the Jackson v. James opinion, 
supra: 
"Section 69 provides for transfer of regis-
tration in certain cases by affidavit. It seems 
therefore that Section 71 is not to be con-
strued, as contended by appellant, as abso-
lute and mandatory to pass a title. In the light 
of the whole chapter, it is evident that its pro-
visions were written to protect innocent pur-
chasers and third parties from fraud, but 
was not in tended to be con trolling as between 
the parties to the transaction. It may well be 
doubted that the Legislature could make man-
datory any such formalities as a prerequisite 
to transfer of title as between the parties. It 
can, of course, prescribe such rules to be ef-
fective as to third parties and it may perhaps 
provide that the registered title shall be an 
element in determining liability for damages 
resulting from the operation of the car, as 
indicated by Section 76. 
"Let us now devote a few minutes to a 
more particular analysis of Section 71, the 
section upon which appellant relies. It will be 
noted from the italicized portion of the sec-
tion quoted, supra, that the title shall be 
deemed to be incomplete. These provisions are 
not absolute, mandatory or controlling in 
their application. They do not confer or deny 
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substantive rights. They are procedural or 
evidentiary in nature. They provide a flag 
of warning to prospective transferees or en-
cumbrancers, much as do the registry acts 
relative to real estate or chattel mortgages. 
Such was the effect given the statute in 
Schwartz v. White, 80 Utah 150, 30 P. (2) 
643." 
Does the fact that Child was involved in an 
accident out of which arose plaintiff's claim for 
damages against him and Hardman change the situ-
ation so that ownership in the vehicle would not 
pass between them but would pass if plain tiff's 
claim did not exist? The same principles apply to 
the sale of an automobile as to any other personal 
property, irrespective of what happens to the ve-
hicle after the transaction has occurred. This pick-
up was a specific piece of property. The automo-
bile was in a deliverable state. The repairs requested 
by Child had been made ( R. 28). The purchase 
price had been agreed on ( R. 30 and 40). Hardman 
would not have paid Barrus Motor Company for 
the truck unless assured by Child that he would 
take it (R. 27 and 31-32). Hardman's reluctance 
to pay for the truck unless Child accepted it before-
hand is borne out by the fact that the vehicle Hard-
man did take from Barrus and was towing to Sun-
set when the accident happened was on consignment 
(R. 41). If the mutual understanding of Hardman 
and Child had not been that Child had purchased 
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the truck, would not Hardman have also taken pos-
session of the pickup under consignment? The Uni-
form Sales Act adopted by Utah, Sections 60-2-2 
and 60-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating 
to transfer of property and title, apply to this situ-
ation: 
"60-2-2. Property and specific goods 
passes when parties so in tend. ( 1) Where 
there is a con tract to sell specific or ascer-
tained goods, the property in them is trans-
ferred to the buyer at such time as the par-
ties to the contract intend it to be transferred. 
" ( 2) For the purpose of ascertaining the 
intention of the parties, regard shall be had 
to the terms of the contract, the conduct of 
the parties, usage of trade and the circum-
stances of the case. 
"60-2-3. Rules for ascertaining inten-
tion.- Unless a different intention appears, 
the following are rules for ascertaining the 
intention of the parties as to the time at which 
the property and the goods is to pass to the 
buyer; 
"Rule ( 1) Where there is an uncondi-
tional contract to sell specific goods in a de-
liverable state, the property in the goods 
passes to the buyer when the contract is made, 
and it is immaterial whether the time of pay-
ment, or the time of delivery, or both, is post-
poned. 
"Rule ( 4) * * * 
(b) Where in pursuance of a con tract to 
sell the seller delivers the goods to the buyer, 
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or to a carrier or other bailee (whether nam-
ed by the buyer or not) for the purpose of 
transmission to or holding for the buyer, he 
is presumed to have unconditionally approp-
priated the goods to the contract, except in 
cases provided for in the next rule and in 
Section 60-2-4. (Rule 5 and Section 60-2-4 
not applicable).* * *" 
In Jones v. C. I. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P. 
896, it was held that title to a new vehicle passed 
to the purchaser upon the happening of a condition 
subsequent. That is, the sale of the old car for 
$1,500.00 by the dealer, to apply upon the purchase 
price. This Court clearly states the principle as 
follows: 
"A sale involves a present transfer of 
the title in the goods from the seller to the 
buyer. A contract to sell implies that the 
ti tie in the goods remains vested in the seller 
and is to be transferred to the buyer at some 
future time. Whether a contract is one of sale 
or an executory contract to sell depends al-
ways upon what the parties to it intend in re-
gard to the time when the title in the property 
is to go to the buyer. If they intend the title 
to be transferred when the contract is made, 
it is a contract of sale; otherwise it is a con-
tract to sell. The intention of the parties is 
the important and controlling fact to be con-
sidered and given effect in determining the 
nature of a con tract in this regard. There 
may be a sale, a present passing of the title, 
notwithstanding that by the terms of the 
agreement the right to the possession of the 
thing sold is retained by the seller until the 
10 
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purchase price is paid. The intention must be 
determined from a consideration of the na-
ture and terms of the con tract, usages of 
trade, the conduct of the parties and the cir-
cumstances of the case. If no contrary inten-
tion appears from such a consideration, then 
the law presumes, where the contract per-
tains to a specific chattel, in a deliverable 
state, that the parties intend the title to pass 
when the contract is made, and this is true 
regardless of the fact that payment of the 
price or delivery of the goods, or both, be post-
poned. 
The foregoing propositions are elemen-
tary. They are to be found in the provisions 
of the Uniform Sales Act, Comp. Laws of 
Utah, 1917, ss. 5110, 5127, 5128, Rule 1 (cit-
ing cases.) 
* * * 
"The parties to the con tract now under 
consideration seem not to have expressed any 
intention whatever in regard to when the 
title in the new Cleveland sedan should vest 
in Jones. They say nothing about that matter 
in the conversation on the morning of Octo-
ber 8th, nor in any of the correspondence 
which passed between them. Jones agreed, in 
effect, that he would buy the new sedan and 
pay $1875.00 for it, if and when the sales 
company sold his old car for $1500.00 net to 
him, the proceeds of the sale to that amount 
to apply upon the price of the new car, and 
that he would pay the balance of $375.00 when 
he took possession of the new car. Both par-
ties understood and intended that the sales 
company should retain the right to the pos-
session of the sedan until the entire purchase 
11 
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price was paid. The company did sell the old 
car for more than the amount which Jones 
asked for it and received the money, so that 
Jones, as a result of that transaction, in fact 
paid $1500.00 which is all that he claims in 
this action, toward the price of the new sedan. 
To all intents and purposes, the situation 
was then the same as if Jones had stepped 
into the sales company's office and handed 
over $1500.00 in money as a part payment on 
the automobile, then on exhibition in the 
showroom, and said that he would return 
within a few days and pay the balance of 
$375.00 and take the new car." 
This decision was cited with approval in the 
later case of Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah 61, 218 
P. 2d 1069. See also Davis v. Semloh Hotel, Inc., 86 
Utah 318, 44 P. 2d 689. 
The evidence of a present sale and transfer 
of the ownership of title in this vehicle is even 
stronger than Jones v. C. I. Trust, supra, because 
in this situation there was no condition subsequent 
upon which the title to the automobile should pass, 
such as the sale of the purchaser's automobile, but 
rather, it was intended by the parties that owner-
ship should pass to Child before Hardman paid 
Barrus for the pickup. The ownership of the pick-
up at the time of the accident is only germane to 
the question of whether there was any evidence to 
support the issue that Hardman had the right to 
control Child in the operation of the pickup, but 
12 
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even if we assume that ownership had not passed 
to Child, his status would be that of a bailee or a 
prospective purchaser, which would not establish 
a presumption of or constitute evidence that he had 
the right to control the manner in which Child drove 
the truck. 
There is a long line of Utah decisions holding 
that ownership raises no presumption of agency or 
control in the owner. Galarowicz v. Ward, 230 P. 2d 
576, 119 Utah 611, reaffirms this principle and re-
fers to earlier Utah decisions. 
The fact that the owner of a car may benefit 
from the operation of a car by another, does not 
make the former the bailee's agent. Conklin v. 
Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437. 
The complaint alleges that Child was driving 
the truck as the agent or servant of Hardman, how-
ever, the issue of whether Child was a servant or 
employee was apparently abandoned by plaintiff, 
and the court did not submit the issue to the jury 
in his instructions. The test of whether the rela-
tionship of principal and agent exists is set out 
succinctly in Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56, P. 
2d 1049, as follows: 
"The test of whether one is the agent of 
the other depends upon the right of control 
of one over the other. The same principles 
of agency apply to the running of an auto-
mobile as apply to any other field of action. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The fact that the automobile is capable of 
causing so much damage has led the court, 
sometimes unwillingly, to depart from the 
fundament! principles of principal and agent 
in order to hold owners responsible, the 
thought in the minds of the court being that 
more responsibility should be visited upon 
the owner of such an instrument because of 
the potentialities of mischief." 
* * * * * 
"Many cases have loosely used such ex-
pressions such as 'for and on behalf' or 'in the 
business of,' or 'for the benefit of.' As stated 
before, the inquiry must be directed to the 
question of agency in the operation of the 
car rather than to the question of agency 
for the accomplishment of some ultimate 
purpose." 
The same principle is discussed in Dowsett v. 
Dowsett, 116 Utah 12,207 P. 2d 809: 
"* * * 'An agent who is not subject to 
control as to the manner in which he per-
forms the acts that constitute the execution 
of his agency is in a similar relation to the 
principal as to such conduct as one who agrees 
only to accomplish mere physical results. For 
the purpose of determining liability, they are 
both 'independent contractors' and do not 
cause the person for whom the enterprise is 
undertaken to be responsible * * * .' " 
Hardman, not being in the pickup, could exer-
cise no physical control oYer it and even if we 
adopt plaintiff's theory that he had an interest in 
having Child drive the truck to Sunset in order 
14 
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that sales documents could be executed and arrange-
ments be made for payment of the purchase price, 
such does not make Child his agent in the manner 
in which Child drove the truck. Before leaving 
Tooele Hardman suggested to Child that they pass 
each other occasionally ( R. 32) , a usual admonition 
between drivers on a trip so that if trouble develops 
one may assist the other. When they made a tem-
porary stop after leaving Tooele Hardman gave 
Child no instructions either to stop or in driving 
the remainder of the trip to Sunset (R. 35). 
If Child was a prospective purchaser, he was 
still acting in his own benefit, and the relationship 
between them was bailor and bailee. 31 A.L.R. 2d 
1455. Plaintiff may contend that the relationship 
between them was that of joint venture, however, 
the basis for that relationship is contractual and 
the use of the vehicle must be in furtherance of the 
business objective provided for in the contract. Der-
rick v. Salt Lake & Ogden Ry. Co., 50 Utah 573, 168 
P. 335, in which it was held that joint venture 
existed. Said the court: 
"The contractural relations of plaintiff 
and his traveling companions were substan-
tially the same as they would have been if 
they jointly hired an automobile with which to 
make the trip, with the understanding that 
they would jointly pay the expenses and mu-
tually and concurrently direct the journey and 
the details thereof. The trip was therefore 
15 
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a joint enterprise in which these parties had 
a community of interest and in which they all 
equally had a voice and a right to be heard 
respecting the details of the journey. Under 
these circumstances the negligence of Merritt 
in the management of the automdbile at the 
time of the collision was imputed to plain-
tiff." 
There was no evidence of such an arrangement 
between Hardman and Child. See also the case of 
Foxley v. Gallagher, 55 Utah 289, 185 P. 77. 
The principles of law applicable were further 
elaborated upon in the case of Fox v. Lavender, 
supra, which involved an action brought against a 
wife riding in an automobile owned by the husband 
and wife for injuries arising out of an accident 
which occurred while the automobile was being driv-
en by the husband on an errand for the wife. Even 
under those facts the court held that they were not 
engaged in a joint venture. The fact that the wife 
was a joint owner and had a common destination, 
did not in and of itself make it a joint venture." 
The fact that Child and Hardman were not in 
joint possession of the automobile at the time of 
the accident is important in determining whether 
Hardman had the right to control the vehicle. Judge 
Wolfe in the Fox vs. Lavender opinion makes some 
16 
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further interesting comments on the law of joint 
venture. He quotes from Coleman vs. Bent, 100 
Conn. 527, 124 Atl. 224: 
"What sort of an arrangement will make 
the parties to it joint adventurers in the op-
eration of a vehicle in which all are riding is 
well settled. A typical case is where two or 
more jointly hire a vehicle for their common 
purpose and agree that one of their number 
shall drive it. In such a case the possession of 
the vehicle is joint and each has an equal right 
to control its operation. The better considered 
cases hold that such common possession and 
common right of control, resulting in common 
responsibility for negligent failure to con-
trol are the earmarks of the legal relation 
of a joint adventure in the operation of a 
vehicle." 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, 
Sec. 491, states the effect of joint enterprise on 
contributory negligence as follows: 
''Any one of several persons engaged in 
an enterprise is barred from recovery against 
a negligent defendant by the contributory 
negligence of any other of them if the enter-
prise is so far joint that each member of the 
group is responsible to the third person in-
jured by the negligence of fellow members." 
Could it be contended reasonably that if the de-
fendant Hardman had collided with the automobile 
in which the plaintiff was riding, that the defen-
dant Child would have joint liability with Hardman 
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for the operation of the latter's vehicle? The situa-
tion as shown by the evidence seems to compel a 
negative answer. 
The transaction between Hardman and Child 
was complete before they left Tooele. The only fur-
ther interest Hardman had in the matter was to 
obtain his money from Child when they reached 
Sunset. He did not attempt to control Child in the 
operation of the vehicle, nor did he have any right 
to do so. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON 
THE LAW AND BY FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE 
JURY THE DEFENDANT HARDMAN'S THEORY OF 
THE CASE. 
The court's specific instructions which the de-
fendant Hardman believes are erroneous are set out 
as follows: 
"Instruction No. 10 
"This is an action by Ida M. Johnson, 
administratrix of the estate of C. Tennyson 
Johnson, deceased, to recover on behalf of her-
self as the widow, and Don Allen Johnson, a 
son of deceased, damages for the death of the 
deceased C. Tennyson Johnson, the husband 
and father of the above mentioned persons. 
"In her complaint plaintiff alleges that 
that on the 20th day of December, 1954, C. 
Tennyson Johnson was a passenger in an 
automobile being driven by George W. Wil-
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Iiams in a westerly direction on U. S. High-
way No. 40, approximately eight miles west 
of the limits of Salt Lake City; she alleges 
that defendant Child as agent of defendant 
Hardman was driving a pickup truck in an 
easterly direction on said highway; she al-
leges that said defendant negligently drove 
said truck at an excessive speed on the left side 
of the highway at a time when the highway 
was not free of oncoming traffic and such 
negligence proximately caused the death of 
C. Tennyson Johnson; plaintiff alleges that 
the death of said C. Tennyson Johnson has 
caused his widow and child general damages 
in the sum of $75,000.00 and funeral and 
burial expenses in the sum of $828.23. 
"Defendants in their answers deny that 
they were negligent and deny that the widow 
and children of C. Tennyson Johnson have 
been damaged, as a result thereof. 
"The foregoing is not to be taken by you 
as a statement of the evidence introduced in 
this case but it is merely a statement of the 
contentions of the parties as disclosed by their 
pleadings." 
"Instruction No. 12 
"You are instructed that under the laws 
of this state, ownership interest in personal 
property passes at the time the parties to the 
contract intended for it to be transferred; 
and unless a different intention appears from 
the evidence, ownership passes to a purchaser 
when the contract of purchase is completely 
agreed upon. Unless the seller gives credit to 
the purchaser, the purchaser is not entitled to 
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the possession of personal property until he 
tenders payment therefor. 
"If you find from the evidence that at 
Tooele, Utah, the defendant Child, after an 
inspection of the truck at the Barrus Motor 
Company's place of business, expressed his 
satisfaction with it and said he would buy it 
and pay therefor six hundred and fifty dol-
lars plus the trade in value of his Ford auto-
mobile, five hundred dollars of which he was 
to pay when the parties returned from Tooele 
to Sunset, Davis County, Utah, and the bal-
ance of one hundred and fifty dollars at a 
later date; and if you further find that de-
fendant Hardman paid Barrus Motor Com-
pany of Tooele for the truck and delivered the 
san1e to Child pursuant to said agreement 
without an intention to retain any further 
interest in said truck, then you are instructed 
that at the time of the accident defendant 
Child and not defendant Hardman was the 
owner of the truck, and Hardman was not 
responsible for its operation -on the way to 
Sunset, Utah." 
"Instruction No. 13 
"You are further instructed that if you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant Hardman and the de-
fendant Child had not entered into com-
pleted agree1nent e1nbracing all the terms 
of how the truck was to be finally paid 
for and that the defendant Hard~an did not 
intend to relinquish absolutely all of his in-
terest in and to the pick-up truck, then I in-
struct you that title to said truck had not 
finally passed to defendant Child and would 
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be in the defendant Hardman. You are fur-
ther instructed that if the defendant Hard-
man requested the defendant Child to drive 
said pick-up truck to Sunset, Utah, where the 
con tract would be finally determined, then 
and in that event the defendant Hardman 
would be responsible for the manner in which 
the defendant Child drove the truck between 
Tooele and Sunset, Utah." 
We appreciate that Instruction No. 10 purports 
to set out the contentions of the parties, however, 
it does not do so in that it omits the denial of Hard-
man that Child was his agent. Neither Instruction 
12 nor 13, which deal with the relationship between 
them, mention the issue of agency. Both of these 
latter instructions tell the jury in substance that if 
they found that Hardman in tended to retain any 
interest in the truck, that ownership in the same 
did not pass to Child. 
In none of the instructions was the jury inform-
ed that Hardman denied that Child was his agent 
or that he was responsible for the manner in 
which Child drove the truck. From all that appears 
in the instructions, the jury could and undoubtedly 
did assume that as the details of the transaction 
were not completed in all respects, including every 
detail, Hardman was responsible for Child's conduct. 
In no instruction was the jury told that for the 
negligence of Child to be imputed to Hardman the 
latter must have the right to control the manner in 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which the truck was driven. The word "control" 
is not mentioned anywhere in the instructions. 
Reading the instructions in their entirety, as 
we must do, compels the conclusion that Hardman's 
theory of defense was not submitted to the jury, 
which was prejudicial error. It was the duty of 
the trial court to cover the theory of all parties in 
the instructions. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 
237 P. 2d 834. Exceptions covering the foregoing 
were taken by the defendant Hardman (R. 219-
222). 
Instruction No. 12 incorrectly states the law 
in that the jury is told that ownership in personal 
property does not pass unless the contract of pur-
chase is "completely" agreed upon, which is contra 
to Sections 60-2-2 and 60-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Section 60-2-3, Rule (1), for ascertaining the 
intentions of the parties, provides: 
"Rule ( 1) Where there is an uncondi-
tional contract to sell specific goods in a de-
liverable state, the property in the goods passes 
to the buyer when the contract is made, and 
it is immaterial whether the time of payment, 
or the time of delivery, or both, is postponed." 
A jury of laymen would undoubtedly interpret 
the word "completely" to mean that in order for 
ownership to be transferred the payment, includ-
ing the terms, would have to be discussed and agreed 
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upon between the parties down to the minute de-
tails. The evidence was undisputed that the pur-
chase price was $650.00 plus Child's old car. 
In paragraph three of the instruction the jury 
was told that in order to absolve Hardman from 
responsibility for Child's operation of the truck they 
must find that Hardman delivered the same to 
Child without "an intention to retain any further 
interest in said truck." It is submitted that even 
if Hardman had intended to retain a seller's lien 
for the unpaid balance of the purchase price, such 
would not prevent the property interest from pass-
ing to Child subject to the lien. What type of "in-
terest" does the court refer to? These men were 
friends. Certainly Hardman had a friendly interest 
in Child's reaching his destination with the truck. 
Under this instruction the jury may have concluded 
that such an interest was sufficient to make Hard-
man liable for Child's conduct. Exceptions were 
taken to this instruction ( R. 220). 
~nstruction No. 13 again tells a jury that if 
they find that "defendants Hardman and Child had 
not entered into a completed agreement embracing 
all of the terms of how the truck was to be finally 
paid for and that the defendant Hardman did not 
intend to relinquish absolutely all of his interest in 
and to the pickup truck", title had not finally passed 
to defendant Child and would be in the defendant 
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Hardman. This part of the instruction reiterates 
and re-emphasizes the statement in Instruction No. 
12 that there must be a "completed agreement" (the 
word "completely" is used in No. 12) and reiterates 
in positive terms that if Hardman did not intend 
to relinquish "absolutely" all of his interest in the 
truck, title to the vehicle did not pass to Child. This 
instruction is susceptible to the same objections as 
No. 12 in that it is contra to the law as provided 
in Sections 60-2-2 and 60-2-3 Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
The two instructions tend to over emphasize 
plaintiff's theory that ownership had not passed to 
Child. The use of the word "absolutely" makes it 
extremely improbable, if not impossible, for a jury 
to find for the defendant Hardman on this issue. 
The last sentence of Instruction No. 13 is er-
roneous as it makes Hardman responsible for Child's 
negligence if the jury finds he was the owner of the 
truck, which is contra to the established principle 
of law that the negligence of a bailee is not imput-
able to a bailor. 
It seems to us that Instructions No. 10, 12 and 
13, and particularly the sense in which the words 
"completed", "completely", and "absolutely" are 
used in the latter two instructions virtually directs 
the jury to find that ownership in the truck had not 
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passed to Child and that because of that fact alone 
Hardman is liable for Child's negligence. 
If these instructions correctly state the law, 
relationship of principal and agent is created be-
tween every person who sells a car under a Con-
ditional Sales Contract and the buyer. It is common 
practice for a purchaser to drive a car with the 
dealer's "stickers" until he receives a Certificate 
of Title from the State Motor Vehicle Department. 
Defendant Hardman's exceptions to Instructions 
No. 12 and 13 are found on pages 220-223 of the 
Record. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the evidence es-
tablishes as a matter of law that Child was not 
Hardman's agent in the manner in which he drove 
the pickup truck, and the verdict should be set 
aside and a judgment of no cause of action entered 
in favor of the defendant Hardman or, in the al-
ternative, he should be granted a new trial because 
of prejudicial error in the court's instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant Arthur Hardman 
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